Redrawing The Boundaries of Citizenship: Israel’s New Hegemony by Rouhana, Nadim & Sultany, Nimer
Redrawing the Boundaries of Citizenship: Israel's New Hegemony
Nadim N. Rouhana; Nimer Sultany
Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 33, No. 1. (Autumn, 2003), pp. 5-22.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0377-919X%28200323%2933%3A1%3C5%3ARTBOCI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-8
Journal of Palestine Studies is currently published by University of California Press.
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at
http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained
prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in
the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.
Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at
http://www.jstor.org/journals/ucal.html.
Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.
JSTOR is an independent not-for-profit organization dedicated to and preserving a digital archive of scholarly journals. For
more information regarding JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
http://www.jstor.org
Sat Mar 31 13:23:13 2007
n i s  article focuses on the dezjelopment since the second Palestinian in- 
tifada of a new consensus in Israeli./ewish society with regard to the 
Arab minority, which the authors call "the iVeul Zionist Hegemony." Af- 
ter describing the attitudes and beliefs undergirding the new consensus, 
the article focuses on four areas in which it manifests itse@ legislation, 
gouernmentpolicies, public opinion, andpublic discourse. n e  result of 
the new policies is to change the meaning of citizenship for nonjeus in 
a n  ethnic Jewish state. 
ISRAELIPOLITICAL THOL~GHTand practice toward its Palestinian citizens have wit- 
nessed a major shift in the last few years, particularly since the second Pales- 
tinian intifada broke out in late September 2000, and Israel's Palestinian citi- 
zens held mass protests a few days later. This shift, which had begun a few 
years earlier, emerged against the background of a larger strategic change in 
Israel's policy aimed at defeating the Palestinian national movement before 
the start of the final status negotiations. Nonetheless, it was the dynamics set 
off by the failure of the Camp David summit that catalyzed the shift, which 
has been reflected in a new consensus within Israeli society in support of new 
discriminatory policies and practices toward the Palestinian minority. We call 
this consensus the New Zionist Hegemony. 
The ideological foundations of the New Hegemony are not alien to Israeli 
political thinking or to Zionist thought and practice. Nonetheless, it represents 
a step further on a continuum running from the extreme Zionist Left, which 
subscribes to equal rights for Arab citizens within an ethnic Jewish state, to 
the extreme Zionist Right, which openly espouses policies of expulsion and 
ethnic cleansing (actual or symbolic). Zionism's New Hegemony has not yet 
reached the extreme right of this continuum, but it has moved closer, and it 
is not inconceivable that the dynamics of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict could 
bring Zionism to this extreme. 
The new phase is characterized by the reversal of policies initiated by 
the Rabin government (1992-9 5 )  both with regard to the Palestinian national 
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movement (via the Oslo process) and Israel's Palestinian minority (certain lib- 
eralizing trends). The new consensus is most dramatically expressed in new 
policies toward the entire Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Palestinian na- 
tional movement, which are beyond the scope of this article. With regard to 
the Palestinian minority, the policies and attitudes growing out of the new 
consensus are more subtle and less visible, but they are transforming the 
meaning of citizenship for "non-Jews" in an ethnic Jewish state. New bound- 
aries for citizenship and democracy are being set that are far more limited 
than those previously tolerated, even on the margin of the Jewish state. 
The New Hegemonic discourse, as noted, evolved in Israel against the 
background of the second Palestinian intifada. In essence, it is an accentua- 
tion of ideological elements deeply rooted in Zionism (though differentially 
weighted in its various strains and across time). But while there is nothing 
really new in the New Hegemonic discourse, the intifada reawakened views 
that had to an extent lain dormant and which have now become widely 
shared across the Zionist spectrum, including large segments of the Zionist 
Left. These views, summarized below, provided the public support that made 
possible the enactment of the new policies that will be described later in this 
article. 
Renewed Emphasis on the Jewishness of Israel 
Given Israel's self-identification as the "state of the Jewish people," it is not 
surprising that Jewish ethnocentrism has always been the most important ide- 
ological pillar guiding Israeli domestic and foreign policies.' Nonetheless, the 
emphasis on Israel's Jewish identity has reached unprecedented heights since 
the October 2000 protests and the earlier rise in Arab national consciousness. 
After all, if Israel is structured (in reality and in the public mind) as an ethnic 
Jewish state, it is only natural that any rise in non-Jewish political and national 
consciousness will be construed as a threat to the Jewish public. In addition, 
the arrival of many immigrants not considered Jewish by Halachic tradition, 
as well as the salient presence of foreign workers imported as substitutes for 
cheap Palestinian labor from the occupied territories, created multiethnic and 
multicultural realities on the ground that are inconsistent with the state's uni- 
ethnic conception and praxis. Today, non-Jewish residents of Israel constitute 
28 percent of the population, including the Arab citizens (about 16 percent 
of Israeli citizens), the noncitizen Arabs living in East Jerusalem, non-Jewish 
immigrants, and foreign workers2 
One manifestation of the exacerbated Jewish ethnocentrism is heightened 
concerns about the "demographic threatn-inevitable in a state where one of 
the national groups subordinates the state to its own interests, exclusively. 
When ethnic control is part of the very definition of the state, protecting the 
dominant group's demographic majority becomes essential not only for the 
state's claims to be democratic but also for its security. Thus, if the state's 
security is defined in ethnic terms demographic concerns readily become 
a perceived security threat, which in turn legitimizes for many Israelis the 
racist discussion of such issues as Arab birth rates, the growing numbers of 
non-Jews, and how many 'yewish immigrants" are not ~ e w i s h . ~  
After the October 2000 protests, open interest in the demography ques- 
tion increased among Israeli academics, policy planners, and government 
officials.* In December 2000-within two months of the protests-a high-
powered conference entitled "The Balance of Israel's National Strength and 
Security" was convened at the Herzliya Interdisciplinary Center by the newly 
created Institute of Policy and Strategy (IPS). The conference, which has since 
become a highly influential annual event, brought together in closed ses-
sions the country's foremost academics, political leaders both Left and Right 
(among the speakers were Ariel Sharon, Benjamin Netanyahu, Shimon Peres, 
and Uri Savir), and senior military figures to discuss national security, foreign 
policy, and strategic planning. One of the main topics on the agenda was 
the "demographic threat," with the overall conference recommendation be- 
ing a demographic "policy of containment" to preserve "the Jewish character 
of Israel." Among the specific recommendations was a "birthrate planning 
policy" that involves encouraging higher Jewish birthrates, canceling subsidy 
payments to families with many children (read: Arab families), adjusting bor- 
ders to include within the Jewish state settlement blocs in the occupied West 
Bank while attaching Arab towns near the Green Line (e.g., the Triangle, East 
Jerusalem) to an eventual Palestinian state, and increasing the Jewish popula- 
tion in "problem areas in terms of demography-particularly the Galilee, the 
Jezreel Valley, and the Negev." Another recommendation aimed at reducing 
the Arab and increasing the Jewish political presence by offering Arab citizens 
the choice between Israeli citizenship and citizenship in a future Palestinian 
state (with residency rights in Israel) and giving Israelis living abroad the right 
to vote in Israeli election^.^ 
The preoccupation with the Jewishness of Israel can also be seen in the 
Jewish establishment's response to the political program put forward by the 
Palestinian minority calling for Israel as a "state for all its citizens" irrespective 
of ethnic identity or religion. This fundamentally democratic platform was 
attacked as "politically extremist," and the legitimacy of its proponents (espe- 
cially Azmi Bishara, head of the National Democratic Alliance, who introduced 
the concept into the public d i~course)~  was attacked. The other response to 
the political platform was to claim that Israel, as currently configured, already 
is a state for all its citizens.' 
The Self-Deceiving Consensus: Israel as Jewish 
and Democratic 
No Zionist party, including on the Left, has ever acknowledged the funda- 
mental contradiction between Israel as an ethnic Jewish state and its claims 
to be democratic. One possible explanation for this denial is the "invisibility" 
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of the Arab minority for Israeli Jews. The prevailing attitude of the gen- 
eral public-shared by most Israeli politicians, left and right, and much of 
academia-is that if Israel is the state of the Jewish people, and if the Jewish 
citizens enjoy democracy, then Israel by definition must be both Jewish and 
democratic. 
During the 1990s, partly as a result of the Palestinian minority's articulation 
of this contradiction, segments of the Israeli political and academic elite began 
to entertain the possibility that there might be a "tension" between a Jewish 
state and democracy. More decisive, however, were efforts to square the cir- 
cle by denying the existence of any contradiction at all. In the end, a broad 
Jewish consensus emerged strongly reaffirming Israel as a "Jewish and demo- 
cratic state"; indeed, the description was formally incorporated into Israel's 
Basic ~aws. '  Prominent scholars, such as Sammy Smooha, even developed 
theoretical models showing how states can be both ethnic (read: controlled 
by a single ethnic group of a multiethnic citizenry) and democratic; the new 
model was called an "ethnic democracy."9 According to this model, Israel, 
along with states such as Estonia, Latvia, and Slovakia, simply represents a 
variant of democracy on a par with other variants, such as "liberal democracy" 
and "consociational democracy." Despite the logical and psychological con- 
tortions required to maintain simultaneously the privileges of the dominant 
ethnic group and the cherished self-image of democracy, many Israeli aca- 
demics enthusiastically embraced the concept of ethnic democracy-a con-
cept that permits the illusion that the state's fundamental contradiction has 
been resolved without actually having to change its reality.'' 
One of the most striking public manifestations of the aggressive efforts 
to portray Israel as both Jewish and democraticl1 is the Kinneret Covenant. 
Drafted in the wake of the October protests by the National Responsibility 
Forum (part of the Rabin Center in Tel Aviv), the covenant was completed 
after prolonged deliberations and signed in August 2001 by some sixty leading 
Jewish religious and secular scholars and opinion makers from across the 
political spectrum. The Palestinian identity of the Arab citizens is entirely 
absent from the document, which focuses entirely on the Jewish identity 
of Israel and reaffirms Israel as a "Jewish and a democratic" state without 
proposing any significant change in the country's structure. It is noteworthy 
that the document, which purports to provide a future vision for Israel, was 
drawn up without the participation of a single Arab citizen. 
The Jewish consensus denying the contradiction between Israel's "Jewish" 
and "democratic" identities is not only a matter of terminology and self- 
perception. It also has far-reaching implications for the future of Arab-Jewish 
relations in Israel and for the possibilities of transforming Israel into a gen- 
uine democracy. For if the Jewish majority believes that Israel already is both 
Jewish and democratic, then the existing legal inequalities and the exclusion 
of Arab citizens from meaningful citizenship can be dismissed either as not 
cause for serious concern or as not unusual in "ethnic democracies." These 
beliefs enable the Jewish majority to slip into an anti-democratic political 
culture and enact discriminatory measures against its own Arab citizens with- 
out any serious self-examination. The result is an anti-liberal political culture 
that is increasingly becoming mainstream. 
Heightened Sense of Existential Threat 
A sense of fear, however repressed, has accompanied Israelis ever since 
they established their state on what had been Palestine. This feeling progres- 
sively faded after the 1967 victory, the 1978 peace agreements with Egypt, 
the Oslo accords with the Palestinians in 1993, and the peace agreement with 
Jordan in 1995.12 Since the start of the second intifada, however, and quite 
apart from the generalized anxiety caused by the suicide bombings, there has 
been a resurgence of the belief that Israel faces an existential threat. The 
October 2000 protests by Palestinian citizens were con- 
strued in Israel as an "internal intifada" or "joining the Jewish Israelis felt 
intifada." Jewish Israelis felt deeply threatened by the deeply threatened by the 
"discovery" that the people they had always called "discovery" that thepeople 
"Israeli Arabs" or "Israel's Arabs" are, in fact, Pales- they had always called 
tinians and part of the Palestinian people; 74 percent "Israel's Arabs9'are, in-fact, 
of the Jewish public polled in the aftermath of the Palestinians andpart of 
protests categorized the behavior of Arab citizens as the Palestinian people 
"trea~on." '~ 
An existential threat is qualitatively different from fears associated with "ter- 
rorist attacks." It involves uncertainty about the country's continued national 
and physical existence and readily evokes the catastrophic Jewish history in 
Europe over the centuries, particularly the Holocaust. A major component of 
the fear relates to the way Israel was created by displacing the native people 
and taking over their homeland; the fact that the Palestinians still exist and 
claim their right to return to their lands feeds the sense of threat.14 However 
unrealistic the fears may be given the gross power asymmetry in Israel's fa- 
vor with regard to the Arabs, there is no doubt about the genuineness of the 
fear or its prevalence. Fear fuels the emergence of anti-liberal political cul- 
tures, and in combination with other factors, such as economic hardship and 
exclusivist ideologies, can lead states to perpetrate crimes against humanity." 
Doubts about the Solvability of the Israeli-Palestinian 
Conflict 
It is in the same context of the uprising and the October 2000 protests 
in Israel that a new belief began to take root in Israeli Jewish society: that 
the conflict with the Palestinians, including the Palestinian citizens, may be 
unsolvable. It is not clear how widespread the belief is, but it appears to 
be increasing among Israeli Jews. A society that believes that an agreement 
cannot be reached with the foe inevitably turns its attention to how best to 
overpower it. According to this logic, Israel needs to suppress and dominate 
the Palestinians in order to contain the conflict and "prevent terror"; the use 
of force comes to be seen as an inevitable component of interaction with 
the enemy. This explains, in past, both the lack of serious criticism for the 
level of carnage Israel is inflicting in the occupied territories and the lack of 
self-examination concerning the use of force and domination in dealing with 
the country's Palestinian citizens. 
In sum, the New Hegemony among Israeli Jews is characterized by a dan- 
gerous mix of Jewish political ethnocentrism and self-deception exacerbated 
by the sense of existential threat and the conviction that the state is perma- 
nently embroiled in a quagmire emanating from the perceived insolubility 
of the conflict with the Palestinians. This climate has created a new consen- 
sus that in turn affects Israel's policies toward its Palestinian citizens. These 
policies themselves reinforce the New Hegemony in what has become a self- 
reinforcing cycle. 
Citizenship for Arabs and Jews in Israel was never equal. The political 
establishment long ago stopped pretending that Arabs enjoy equality, and 
the intelligentsia for the most past accepts as givens both the inequality and 
the state's role in perpetuating it.I6 Even scholars who insist that Israel is a 
"Jewish and democratic" state, such as Smooha and Gavison, acknowledge 
that full equality in a Jewish state is impossible for Arabs.'' The view of 
unequal citizenship with "as many individual rights as possible" and even 
some collective rights represents "the limits of the Zionist paradigm"18-the 
fasthest reaches of the Zionist continuum on the Left with regard to this 
issue. 
The New Hegemony affects the already unequal citizenship of the Pales- 
tinians in Israel to the extent of compromising the very essence of their citi- 
zenship. Thus, the boundaries of that citizenship are being redrawn through 
legislation, government policies, and public discourse to create a new con- 
sciousness among Jews and Arabs alike that the Arab citizens' "citizenship" 
is not real, in other words, that the Arabs are in effect "citizens without 
citi~enship."'~Below we examine manifestations of the changes affecting 
the Palestinian minority in four areas: legislation, government policies, public 
opinion, and public discourse. 
Legislation 
The Israeli Knesset, especially the Fifteenth Knesset (1999-2002), took an 
active past in redrawing the boundaries of Arab citizenship, enacting a number 
of discriminatory laws affecting the Palestinian citizens' political participation, 
right of expression, economic status, and even family life. These laws aim to 
redefine the limits of democracy and legitimate discourse in Israel in keep- 
ing with the Zionist consensus. Since the Palestinian minority is outside this 
consensus, the new legislation can be seen as past and parcel of the dele- 
gitimization process underway.20 Below is a brief discussion of seven of the 
laws enacted in the past two years.21 
On 15 May 2002, the Knesset passed four amendments to existing laws 
that significantly reshaped the rules of the democratic game and parliamen- 
tary debate. Three of these, closely related, concern elections. The first, Ba- 
sic Law: The Knesset, section 7A (Amendment No. 351, is aimed exclusively 
at Arab Knesset candidates (without actually saying so). The amendment 
(a) empowers the Central Elections Committee to prohibit individuals (sub- 
ject to High Court approval) and entire political parties from running for the 
Knesset; (b) stipulates that parties or individuals will be disqualified for reject- 
ing Israel's identity as a "Jewish and  democratic state" (not as a Jewish state 
and/or a democratic state, as stipulated in the law before its amendment); 
(c) stipulates that parties or individuals will be disqualified for supporting the 
armed struggle of an enemy state or of a terrorist organization against the State 
of Israel; and (d) requires candidates to make a declaration in keeping with 
the above provisions (the text of which is provided in the third amendment 
passed the same day, which follows). 
The second elections-related legislation-ThePoliticalPalrties (Amendment 
No. 131Law-2002--changed the rules concerning the registration of politi- 
cal parties, including setting the conditions under which they can be disqual- 
ified from running. The aim of this law was to ensure uniformity with the 
amendment outlined above. The third, the Knesset a nd  Prime Minister Elec- 
tions Law (Amendment no. 461-2002, among other things, spells out the 
precise wording of the declaration required of all candidates under the first 
piece of legislation mentioned above, as follows: "I pledge allegiance to the 
State of Israel and refrain from acting contrary to the principles of section 7A 
of the Basic Law: The Knesset." Making the required pledge in effect bars the 
candidates (and, needless to say, the candidates who are elected) from "acting 
contrary" to what they may consider racist and detrimental to their own com- 
munity's political rights, even using democratic and legal means. In essence, 
the pledge outlaws working toward changing the state's political ideology 
even if this ideology is fundamentally in contradiction with democracy. 
These three amendments together mean that candidates and their par- 
ties must submit to the Zionist consensus in order to have the right to be 
represented in parliament. Moreover, even if the party itself is not disqual- 
ified, the law can now interfere with which candidates the party chooses 
to run since the party's platform and list of candidates must be submitted 
to the Central Elections Committee. And because the Zionist hegemony de- 
fines which organizations are terrorist and which states are "enemy," the law 
gives the committee additional leeway to deprive those who deviate from 
this hegemony of the right to representation. The result is that these laws 
significantly reduce the effectiveness of Palestinian political participation by 
removing what is certainly a main incentive for political action: the possibility 
of influencing decision making and ultimately changing the existing social 
order in the direction of greater fairness. Instead, the amendments confine 
legitimate change to the boundaries defined by the Zionist consensus and 
anchor them in constitutional law.22 
The fourth piece of legislation passed on 15 May 2002-the Penal Law 
(Amendment No. 66)-2002-infringes upon the free speech not only of 
Arab Knesset candidates but of all citizens. The amendment prohibits the pub- 
lication of material deemed to have a "substantial possibility" of leading to an 
act of violence-another provision open to wide interpretation, but certainly 
applicable to support for the intifada. Although the amendment was a direct 
response to a case in which the High Court had ruled against the government's 
attempt to prosecute a journalist for supporting a terrorist ~rganization,'~ its 
underlying aim was to bypass the legal difficulties involved in prosecuting 
Arab MKS for statements perceived as encouraging "civil insurrection" in the 
wake of the October 2000 protests. 
Two months later, on 22 July 2002, the Knesset extended the restric- 
tions it had imposed on candidates for the Knesset to those who had 
already been elected. Thus, the Knesset Members (Immunity, Rights a nd  
Duties) (Amendment No. 29) ~aw-2002'~ stipulates that the parliamen- 
tary immunity granted to MKS, as spelled out in the original law, will be 
lifted if the MK (a) commits an act or expresses an opinion rejecting the 
State of Israel as the state of the Jewish people; (b) rejects the democratic 
nature of the state; (c) incites to racism; or (d) supports the armed strug- 
gle of an enemy state or acts of terror against the State of Israel. Without 
parliamentary immunity, the MK can be prosecuted for any act or state-
ment deemed in violation of the law. This amendment effectively curtails 
the political rights of Israel's Palestinian citizens by limiting the free speech of 
their elected representatives and prohibiting them from publicly challenging 
the definition of the state or attempting to change that definition by lawful 
means. Moreover, by prohibiting support for acts of "terror" against Israel, 
the statute can outlaw the expression of support for the intifada and the 
Palestinian struggle to end occupation (despite the fact that the principles 
of international law permit the use of force under certain clearly defined 
circumstance^).^^ 
In addition to laws affecting the political rights of Arab citizens in Israel, the 
Knesset has also passed legislation that discriminates against them economi- 
cally. The Emergency Economic Plan (Legislative Amendments to Achieve the 
Budget's Goals a n d  Economic Policy for the 2002-2003 Fiscal Year) Law- 
2002, which was submitted as a government bill, passed on 5 June 2002. 
This law stipulates drastic cuts in governmental assistance paid to families 
not covered by the principle of "entitling service," broadly defined as service 
of a family member in one of the security forces. Because most Arabs do not 
serve in these organizations, the law is a thinly disguised means to deny Arab 
families the benefits available to virtually all Jewish families. This effectively 
reinforces the status of Arab citizens as the weakest socioeconomic class in 
Israel and Arab children as the most vulnerable group in Israeli society. It is 
not far-fetched to suggest that, at least in part, demographic considerations 
contributed to the bill's broad support by the Jewish MKS, two-thirds of whom 
voted for it. 
One of the gravest steps limiting the boundaries of citizenship for Arab 
citizens is the Nationality a n d  Entry into Israel Law (Temporay Order- 
2003) passed by the Sixteenth Knesset on 31 July 2003. The bill, intro- 
duced by the government, grew out of an initiative by Interior Minister Eli 
Yishai, who in January 2002 had instructed his legal advisors to explore the 
possibility of introducing legislation to reduce the number of Palestinians- 
referred to in the new law as "residents of the region," with "region" be- 
ing defined as Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip--who become natural- 
ized following marriage to Israeli ~i t izens. '~  The effect of the law is that 
families resulting from the marriage of an Israeli (invariably Arab) citizen 
and a Palestinian from the territories must either live separately or leave the 
~ount ry .~ '  
Government Policies and Decisions 
The preoccupation with demography and the "Jewishness" of the state of 
Israel that constitutes an important element of the New Hegemony is very 
much reflected in a number of government policies. One example is the 
new policy on family reunification, which resulted in the 2003 law discussed 
above. The policy, whose explicit aim was to sharply decrease the number 
of Palestinians from the occupied territories eligible for naturalization, was 
unanimously approved by the government in May 2 0 0 2 . ~ ~  The initiative was 
put forward by Interior Minister Yishai, who several months earlier had frozen 
thousands of naturalization requests by Palestinians on the basis of family 
reuni f i~a t ion .~~ 
In September 2002, Minister of Labor and Social Affairs Shlomo Benizri 
revived, after a four-year hiatus, the Public Council for Demography. The 
council had been set up to monitor the activity of the ministry's Demography 
Center, and its task was to set policy guidelines to ensure the "preservation of 
the Jewish character of ~ s r a e l . " ~ ~  The same agenda is the raison d'Etre of the 
quasi-government Strategic Forum for the Advancement of the Jewish Char- 
acter of Israel, established by the Zionist Council of the World Zionist Orga- 
nization (WZO). Both bodies strongly promote government policies relating 
to demography-a number of which echo recommendations of the Herzliya 
Conference discussed above-including efforts to influence birthrates. Among 
these is providing financial benefits for a couple's third and fourth child while 
canceling them for the fifth and subsequent children. This policy is clearly 
geared toward increasing the Jewish birthrate, since Jews tend to have fam- 
ilies of two to three children, while removing incentives for Arabs, where 
families of five or more children are more common. As a member of the 
Strategic Forum forthrightly explained, benefits for a "fifth child and more 
gives preference to Arab families, even in comparison with ultra-Orthodox 
Jewish fa mi lie^."^' The government's discriminatory use of financial benefits 
was already witnessed in its sponsorship of the above-mentioned legislation 
cutting subsidies for families without members having served in the military- 
in other words. Arab families. 
Another demographically motivated decision came in October 2002, when 
the government directed the settlement division of the WZO to establish four- 
teen new settlements in the Negev in keeping with the Jewish Agency's mul- 
tiyear plan to establish a Jewish majority in those areas of the Galilee and the 
Negev where Palestinians continue to be the majority. The WZO was put in 
charge of the project so as to bypass a High Court ruling against land allo- 
cation on the basis of national belonging. Moreover, in an effort to mask the 
blatant racism of the plan, its objective was stated as achieving a "Zionist" 
rather than a "Jewish majority," thereby enabling Arabs with a demonstrated 
"commitment to the state" (i.e., who serve in the army) to participate. Given 
the small number of Arabs eligible, however, the effect of the policy, that is, 
breaking up the Arab population concentrations is the same.32 (It should be 
noted that the land issue had come to the fore several months earlier, in July 
2002, when the government decided to support a Knesset bill providing for 
the allocation of land to Jews only. As a result of disagreements concerning 
the proposed legislation within Sharon's National Unity cabinet, however, the 
government's official support was withdrawn.) 
A highly significant step in shrinking the boundaries of Palestinian citizen- 
ship was the move in August 2002 by Interior Minister Yishai to revoke the 
citizenship of two Palestinian citizens of Israel and to nullify the permanent 
residency status of a Palestinian from East Jerusalem based on the allega- 
tions that they had helped carry out suicide actions inside Israel and were 
members of terror organizations. The fact that the citizenship of only one 
of the Arab citizens was successfully revoked (rendering him stateless), in 
September 2 0 0 2 , ~ ~  does not make the precedent any less serious. The interior 
minister has never revoked the citizenship of a Jewish citizen of Israel, nor was 
such a possibility ever raised, even in cases of the gravest security offenses.34 
With regard to the Palestinian minority, however, it seems that the New 
Hegemony sees citizenship as a conditional privilege to be conferred by the 
state. 
Illustrative of the extent to which ideas once considered extreme have 
become acceptable in the New Hegemony is the official legitimization of 
the ideas of Rehavam Ze'evi. Ze'evi, minister of tourism and founder of the 
extreme rightist Moledet party whose core ideology is the transfer (ethnic 
cleansing) of the Palestinians from the occupied territories and the encour- 
agement of Palestinian citizens of Israel to accept "voluntary" transfer, was 
assassinated in Jerusalem by members of the Popular Front for the Libera- 
tion of Palestine in October 2001. As the first-year anniversary of his death 
approached, the Ministry of Education issued a circular instructing school 
principals to devote an hour of class time or "another instructional activity" to 
commemorate the "milestones in Zionism that Rehavam Ze'evi's actions and 
contributions touched on in achieving the national goal."35 The circular made 
no mention of Ze'evi's vociferous support of ethnic cleansing, but his ideol- 
ogy is well known. Ze'evi had never tried to move toward the center; it was 
the "center," as it has emerged with the New Hegemony, which has moved 
toward his ideology, with the government itself legitimizing it as something 
young Israelis should be taught. 
Public Opinion Polls 
Public opinion polls surveying the views of the Jewish public toward Arab 
citizens, their rights, and their political behavior reveal a picture of increasing 
intolerance. There is sizeable support among Jewish citizens for anti-liberal 
policies.36 For example, with respect to security, nearly taro-thirds of Jewish 
citizens saw their Arab compatriots as a security threat in 2001, and over 
70 percent did so in 2002. Table 1 summarizes the results of several polls 
taken in these years. 
O/O Date of Poll Pollsters 
October 2001 
November 2001 
February 2002 
August 2002 
Pedhazur and Canetti 
Hasisi and Pedhazur 
Jaffee Center 
Ma anv  
Source: Nimer Sultany, Citizens without Citizenship: Mada s First Annual Political Monitoring 
Report: Israel and the Palestinian Minoricy 2000-2002 (Haifa: Mada-The Arab Center for Applied 
Social Research, 2003). 
Seeing Arabs as a danger to security can be the basis of or the consequential 
justification for extremist attitudes toward Arabs. The Jaffee Center survey of 
February 2002, in which only the opinions of Jewish Israelis were examined, 
showed an increase in support for statements calling for the expulsion of 
Arab citizens: one-third of the Jewish population supported their transfer, 
while two-thirds supported encouraging them to emigrate from Israel. Table 2 
summarizes the result^.^' 
Position O/O in 2002 O/o in Previous Years 
Transfer of Arab citizens of Israel 31 24 in 1991 
Transfer of Palestinian residents of the occupied territories 46 38 in 1991 
Encourage emigration among Arab citizens of Israel 60 49 in 2001 
Encourage Arabs to leave the state (without indicating 53 NA 
if they leave willingly or by compulsion, or whether 
regarding citizens of Israel or residents of the occupied 
territories) 
Source: Derived from Asher Arian, Securicy Opinion 2002 (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic 
Studies, 2002); and Public Opinion on National Security 2000 (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic 
Studies, 2000). 
When more specific questions about population transfer or exchange are 
asked, a similar picture emerges. Table 3 summarizes the findings of various 
surveys on this issue. These findings indicate wide support for positions that 
seek to rid Israel of Arab citizens or to expel them from their homeland. 
Source: Nimer Sultany, Citizens without Citizenship: Mada s Fimt Annual Political Monitoring 
Report Israel and the Palestinian Minoricy 2000-2002 (Haifa: Mada-The Arab Centerfor Applied 
Social Research,2003). 
The political culture also is characterized by increased tolerance for the 
use of force. For example, in the Ma'ariv survey of 6 October 2000-after ten 
Arab citizens were killed--45 percent of the Jewish public said the Israeli 
security forces had been too soft in handling the protests, and 43 percent 
said that the security forces handled them A March 2001 survey by 
researchers at the University of Haifa to assess why Israeli police used lethal 
force against Palestinian citizens found that three factors combined to mold 
a "nonliberal democracy" in Israel: (1) the centrality of public debate and 
the widespread belief that Israel will survive only as long as it is stronger 
than its enemies; (2) a constant striving for homogeneity and consensus; and 
( 3 )  the ethnocentricity built into Israeli culture and ~ociety.~ '  Public opinion 
polls show that most of the Jewish public believes the use of force against 
Palestinians in the occupied territories is acceptable.'' 
Public Discourse 
Of all the manifestations of the new hegemonic discourse, perhaps the 
most striking are public statements of animosity, racism, and, indeed, hatred 
toward Israel's Palestinian citizens. Officials at all levels of the government, 
starting with the prime minister, make such statements. During a July 2002 
Knesset debate, for example, Arab MK Talab El-Sana addressed the prime 
minister as follows: "I am not a Jew, and you acknowledge this. So where is 
my state?" Sharon replied by recounting what his parents had explained to 
him when he was a child: 
They said, so as not to confuse you, that I should know the 
following: all the rights over the Land of Israel are Jewish 
rights. In the Land of Israel, all the rights must be given to 
the people who live here. That is the difference between 
rights over the Land and rights in the and.^' 
This statement encapsulates the limits of Arab citizenship. Perhaps the 
best status differential that defines the distinction between rights over and 
rights in is that of citizen versus resident. Citizens have rights over their 
homeland. Residents, by contrast, cannot claim such rights but have limited 
rights enabling them to reside, work, and pursue an education in the country. 
Apart from the right to vote (of limited effectiveness in terms of influencing 
Israeli policy), the status of the Arab citizens is now very much like that of 
noncitizen residents in democratic countries. Indeed, 
their status in many respects is worse, insofar as they Apart from the right to 
are treated as unwanted, and, on some issues, such as vote (of limited 
land control, even as enemies. effectiveness in influencing 
Depiction of the Palestinian citizens as enemies Israelipolicy), the status 
is by no means uncommon in the public discourse. of the Arab citizens is now 
Even leaving aside extremes like comparing Palestini- very much like that of 
ans to vermin-"reproducing like insects," "swarming noncitizen residents in 
like ants"; should be gotten rid of "the same way you democratic countries 
get rid of lice;" "foxes who [have] moved up a level, 
and are now snakes and s~or~ions"~~-ex~ress ionsof hatred or contempt 
abound. The more respectable refer to "cult~iral" differences. For example, 
the president of Israel, Moshe Katzav, was quoted in the Jerusalem Post in 
May 2001 as saying, "There is a huge gap between us Uews] and our enemies 
not just in ability but in morality, culture, sanctity of life, and conscience. They 
are our neighbors here, but it seems as if at a distance of a few hundred me- 
ters away there are people who do not belong to our continent, to our world, 
but actually belong to a different galaxy."43 A similar idea was expressed by 
Avraham Burg, at the time Speaker of the Knesset and a contender for lead- 
ership of the Labor pasty, in an interview on ABC's iVightline on 2 August 
2001. In response to a question about his country's policies in the occupied 
territories, Burg noted that while Israelis live in the "Western value system," 
"different rules" apply in the Middle East because "we're living in a differ- 
ent hemisphere, of Islamic fundamentalists, of human bombs, of suiciders. . . 
of killers, of kidnappers, of people you do not want your daughter to get 
married to." The value system was also evoked by former prime minister 
Ehud Barak in an April 2002 interview with historian Benny Morris: "They 
[the Palestinians] are products of a culture in which to tell a lie . . . creates no 
dissonance. They don't suffer from the problem of telling lies that exists in 
Judeo-Christian culture. Truth is seen as an irrelevant category. There is only 
that which serves your purpose and that which doesn't."44 
Though hate speech infects all levels of public discourse, from the aca- 
demic community, the judiciary, and religious leaders to commentators and 
analysts,45 statements by political figures probably carry the most weight. 
Palestinian citizens are openly referred to as a threat. Former prime minister 
Benjamin Netanyahu, for example, stated in a September 2002 interview that 
"Quiet with the Arabs outside and inside of Israel is based on one principle 
only: d e t e r~ence . "~~  Effie Eitam, head of the National Religious Party (NRP) 
and currently minister of construction and housing, said in a March 2002 inter- 
view that "the Israeli Arabs are in large measure the ticking bomb beneath the 
whole democratic Israeli order inside the Green Line. . . . I say that the State 
of Israel today faces an existential threat that is characterized by being an 
elusive threat, and elusive threats by their nature resemble can~er ."~ '  The os- 
tensible reason the Palestinian citizens constitute a threat was summed up by 
Barak in the above mentioned interview: "if the conflict with the Palestinians 
continues, Israel's Arabs will serve as the 'spearpoint' [of the Palestinians] in 
their struggle, and this may necessitate changes in the rules of the democratic 
game . . . in order to assure Israel's Jewish ch a~ac t e r . "~~  
Politicians wanting to avoid outright talk of transfer speak about the "ex- 
change of lands" option-a code word for getting rid of Palestinian citizens 
involving (in the context of a future Palestinian state) exchanging densely 
populated Arab areas inside Israel for settlement areas in the occupied terri- 
tories. While Barak in the April 2002 interview cautioned against government 
spokesmen openly advocating such an exchange, and specified that it "could 
only be done by agreement," he added that it "makes demographic sense 
and is not inconceivable." Another Labor politician favoring the "transfer of 
lands" is MK Ephraim Sneh, transportation minister in Sharon's national unity 
government. When asked why the Palestinian Israelis would agree to this 
solution, he replied, "This whole process is not easy.. . . There may be some 
individuals who will have to change their nationality; we have to go for a 
natural solution."49 
Right-wing political figures are less coy about advocating transfer outright. 
MK Avigdor Lieberman, minister of transportation in Sharon's government 
and head of the Russian immigrant party Yisrael Beitenu, for example, said 
in an interview on Meet the Press, "I do not reject the transfer option. We 
don't have to escape reality. If you ask me, Israel's number one problem is 
not the Palestinian problem; it is first of all [the problem ofl Arab citizens of 
the State of Israel. . . . Do I consider them citizens of the State of Israel? No!. . . 
They have to find a place where they will feel cornf~r tab le ."~~ MK Binyamin 
Elon, the current minister of tourism, opts for the more palatable "voluntary 
transfer," which he explains as "aiding Arabs to want to get onto buses, a 
kind of pushing them until they say 'I want to go."'i' The distinction between 
"voluntary transfer" and "transfer by force" was supported by Attorney Gen- 
eral Elyakim Rubinstein, who believes that voluntary transfer is an acceptable 
subject for public debate but that advocating outright expulsion could result 
in a criminal investigation.j2 
Transfer has a venerable history in Zionist thought, and many Israelis un- 
doubtedly believe that an opportunity was missed at Israel's founding. In an 
October 2002 article, Benny Morris, author of i%e Birth of the Palestinian 
Refugee Problem, for example, noted that David Ben-Gurion "probably could 
have engineered a comprehensive rather than a partial transfer in 1948" and 
then speculated that the Israeli leader would perhaps "now regret his re- 
straint. Perhaps, had he gone the whole hog, today's Middle East would be 
a healthier, less violent place, with a Jewish state between Jordan and the 
Mediterranean and a Palestinian Arab state in ~ r an s j o r d an . "~~  
Hatred for Arabs has on occasion been given a religious underpinning. 
Influential and important rabbis have frequently expressed antipathy toward 
Arabs, and some have even encouraged violence. In April 2001, Rabbi Ovadia 
Yosef, the spiritual leader of Shas and one of Israel's senior rabbis, said, "Arabs 
come from the seed of Amalek" and should be "bombed and annihilated." 
When these words provoked an outcry among Arabs, Yosef published a "clari- 
fication," in which he explained that he did not mean to attack Arabs as Arabs, 
but to attack terrorists and murderers.54 
The New Zionist Hegemony, characterized by the movement of Israel's 
mainstream political "center" to the right on the Zionist continuum, effec- 
tively has redrawn the boundaries of citizenship in Israel in such a way that 
meaningful citizenship is available to Jewish citizens only. For Arab citizens, 
citizenship has been redefined through legislation and government policy to 
push them even further to the margins of Israeli politics and society. Their 
treatment as residents with unequal rights, if not as enemies whose political 
power must be combated, is supported by the Jewish public, as reflected in 
opinion polls and public statements by government figures and other elites. 
Though attempts to explain the ideological, political, social, and psycho- 
logical foundations of the New Hegemony are beyond the scope of this paper, 
it would be useful to examine Israeli demographic trends over the last two 
decades in conjunction with changing economics, rising national conscious- 
ness within the Arab minority, the failure of Oslo, and the politics of fear in 
Israel. It would be important to examine Israel's ongoing Judaization project 
both inside the 1967 borders and in the occupied territories, and Palestinian 
resistance to this project. An inquiry along these lines would undoubtedly 
raise questions as to whether, in the circumstances, the emergence of the 
New Hegemony was inevitable given Zionist fears of losing control over an 
indigenous population seen as outside its statehood project. A most pressing 
question is the circumstances under which the current context of Israeli dom- 
ination and Palestinian resistance would move this hegemony even further to 
the right. 
The status of citizenship emptied of real substance cannot be acceptable 
to a national minority whose demographic weight (in absolute numbers) and 
national awareness are constantly on the rise. Furthermore, as the indigenous 
population, the Palestinian citizens believe that their right to citizenship em- 
anates not from Israeli "generosity" but from their very rootedness in their 
homeland. In redrawing the boundaries of citizenship status, Israel is placing 
itself on a confrontation path with its Arab minority. Whether that confronta- 
tion is calculated or the outcome of changes that cumulatively have translated 
into a major policy shift is a question that deserves further examination. 
Whatever the case, the goals of the policy shift are clear: to bolster the 
Jewish character of the state while reducing the status of the Arab citizens to 
something less than citizenship, but in ways not dramatic or abrupt enough 
to disrupt Israel's democratic image abroad or its own comforting illusions 
about itself as "Jewish and democratic.'' The combination of a permissive in- 
ternational climate, strong public support, and the dynamics of the ongoing 
conflict in the occupied territories argue for a continuation, if not an exacer- 
bation, of current policy. But the gradual shrinkage of citizenship boundaries 
for the Arabs could bring the New Hegemony to the far right end of the Zion- 
ist continuum, to such an extent that Israelis will find themselves in a Jewish 
state that no amount of self-deception could term "democratic." 
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